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The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida
Digna): The Integration of Economic
and Social Rights with Civil and
Political Rights in the Inter-American
Human Rights System
ByJo M. PASQUALUCCI"
The fundamental right to life includes, not only the right of every
human being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the
right that he will not be prevented from having access to the
conditions that guarantee a dignified life (vida digna). States have the
obligation to guarantee the creation of the conditions required.'
I. Introduction
The right to life is the most essential of human rights, in that it is
basic to a person's enjoyment of all other rights. The right is so
fundamental in nature that international human rights treaties do not
permit the derogation of the right to life even during times of
emergency or threat to the life of the nation.2 Traditionally, this right,
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1. Villagrin-Morales et al. Case (The "Street Children" Case) (Guatemala),
1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, at 144 (Nov. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Street
Children].
2. See American Convention on Human Rights, art. 27(2), Nov. 22, 1969,
entered into force July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American
Convention]; U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
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which is termed a civil and political right in international law, has
imposed a negative duty on States not to interfere with the right to
life. Thus, it prohibits the State, and State agents, from taking a
person's life except in strictly limited circumstances permitted by law.3
Under its recent controversial interpretation of the right to life,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' (hereinafter "Inter-
American Court" or "Court") has expanded the scope of the right to
include a violation even when no one has died. According to the
Inter-American Court, a person's right to life encompasses the right
to live a "vida digna," meaning a "dignified life" or a "dignified
existence."5 In other words, inherent in the concept of the right to life
are considerations regarding quality of life. The Court's concept of
the right to a "dignified life" obligates the State to generate living
conditions that are at least "minimum living conditions that are
compatible with the dignity of the human person."6 or be liable for
the violation of the right to life. In this regard, the Court clarified
that "the State has the duty to take positive, concrete measures
geared toward fulfillment of the right to a decent life, especially in the
case of persons who are vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes a
high priority."7 The State also has a duty to refrain from inducing
conditions that make it difficult or impede people from attaining the
basic necessities of life.8 As such, within the right to life, States have
some obligation to provide or at least not interfere with the
individual's rights to the basic necessities of life such as adequate
food, drinking water, sanitation, and health care, which are termed
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The American Convention
and other Inter-American human rights documents can be found on the OAS website
available at <http://www.oas.org>, or on the website for the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights, available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org>.
3. The State must also take the necessary positive steps to protect persons from
the violation of their right to life by non-State agents, such as common criminals.
4. The website of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is
<www.corteidh.or.cr>.
5. Indigenous Community Yakye Axa Case (Paraguay), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser.C) No. 125, at 162-4 (June 17, 2005) [hereinafter Yakye Axa]. Many Inter-
American Court judgments are written in Spanish, and the English translations of the
same word or term may vary from one judgment to another. The Spanish term "vida
digna" has been translated as "dignified life" or "dignified existence." This article
generally uses either the Spanish term or the translation "dignified life" which is in
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economic and social rights. The Court's jurisprudence on the right to
life thereby integrates the concepts of economic and social rights with
civil and political rights within the context of the right to life. This
integration arguably contributes to the progressive development of
international law by bridging a traditional doctrinal schism in human
rights law.
The Inter-American Court has held States liable for a violation
of the right to live a "vida digna," and thus a violation of the right to
life, in cases involving children, prisoners, persons confined to State
mental facilities, and indigenous peoples who have lost their ancestral
lands.9 In the Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa cases, for instance, the
Inter-American Court held that Paraguay violated the right to life of
two communities of indigenous peoples who lived miserable
existences for several years while awaiting title and restitution of their
ancestral lands. ° The people, who lived on the side of the road at the
entrances to the land they claimed, did not have access to drinkable
water, sanitary facilities, adequate food, or medicine." Although the
Paraguayan constitution provides for the return of ancestral lands in
specified situations, government authorities delayed processing the
communities' applications for several years, forcing the communities
to turn to the Inter-American human rights system.'2 The Inter-
American Court held Paraguay accountable for the violation of the
right to life of all members of the Communities, even those who had
not died. 3 Judge Garcia Ramirez, in his concurring opinion in the
9. Id; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community Case (Paraguay), Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (March 29, 2006) [hereinafter Sawhoyamaxa].
10. Yakye Axa, supra note 5, at 50; Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9, at 73.61-
73.72.
11. Yakye Axa, supra note 5, at $ 50.92-100 (June 17, 2005); Sawhoyamaxa,
supra note 9, at 73.61-73.72.
12. During this time, thirty people died in the Community, including twenty
children who died of preventable or curable illnesses such as measles, dehydration,
tetanus, and pneumonia. Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9, at T 73.74. Even when the
parents could bring the children to a hospital or clinic, they did not have the money
to pay for the prescribed medication. Id.
13. Yakye Axa, supra note 5, at res. 4 in terms of 160-76 (June 17, 2005). In its
first decision concerning the right to life of indigenous peoples, Yakye Axa v.
Paraguay, the Court specified in its final resolutions that the State had violated the
right to life of the members of that particular indigenous community. Id. Only nine
months later in the Sawhoyamaxa Case under almost identical facts, the Court again
discussed in the decision the right of the Community to live a vida digna, but it did
not specifically hold Paraguay liable for the violation of the right of the entire
Community in its final resolutions as it had done in the Yakye Axa Case.
Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9, at 177.
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Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay case, stated:
[T]he right to life is restored to its original status as an opportunity
to choose our destiny and develop our potential. It is more than
just a right to subsist, but is rather a right to self-development,
which requires appropriate conditions. In such framework, a single
right with a double dimension is set, like the two-faced god Janus:
one side, with a first-generation legal concept of the right to life; the
other side, with the concept of a requirement to provide conditions
for a feasible and full existence. 4
Thus, the Inter-American Court recognizes that the right to life
is not merely a civil and political right, but also includes the economic
and social rights necessary for an individual to have a dignified
existence. In reaching this conclusion, the Court makes economic and
social rights justiciable within the context of the right to life.
In general, the Inter-American Court's jurisprudence on the
right to life has been influential in the developing democracies of the
Americas as well as in other human rights systems. Since its first
cases, the Court has been repeatedly confronted with gross and
systematic violations of the right to life, 5 from extrajudicial
executions by State authorities 16 to the forced disappearances of labor
and student leaders by a government-sponsored death squad. 7 The
Court's rulings on disappearances, 8 which involve a violation of the
14. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community Case (Paraguay), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser.C) No. 146, (Judge Garcia Ramirez, concurring at $ 18) (March 29, 2006).
15. Gross and systematic violations of human rights are perpetrated pursuant to
government policy in such number and in such a manner that the rights to life,
personal integrity, or personal liberty of certain sectors of the population are
threatened. See CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGA, THE BATTLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
GROSS, SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM 16 (1988). Governments have intentionally used gross and systematic
violations of human rights to intimidate and maintain its control over its people. See
THE PRELIMINARY REPORT ON DISAPPEARANCES ON THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONDURAS: THE FACTS SPEAK FOR
THEMSELVES 3, 217 (1994).
16. See Aloboetoe et al. Case (Suriname), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 11
(Dec. 4, 1991) (the arbitrary execution of young male tribal members by the military
in Suriname).
17. Veltsquez-Rodrfquez Case (Honduras), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4
(July 29, 1988).
18. The Inter-American Court has specified that "[t]he phenomenon of
disappearances is a complex form of human rights violation that must be understood
and confronted in an integral fashion." Id. at 150. "The forced disappearance of
human beings is a multiple and continuous violation of many rights under the
Convention that the States Parties are obligated to respect and guarantee. The
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right to life, have been the basis of subsequent international
declarations, treaties, and juridical opinions. Given the Court's
history of such influence, its judgments interpreting the right to life as
including the right to live a "vida digna" are likely both to invoke
controversy and to contribute to the continuing integration of
economic and social rights with civil and political rights in
international law. In particular, the Inter-American Court's
jurisprudence in this area may influence the African human rights
system which recognizes a broad spectrum of human rights.19
Despite its promising inception, the Court has not yet refined
this jurisprudence to the extent necessary for petitioners or States to
identify the parameters of the right to a "dignified life." A large
percentage of the population of the Americas lives in abject poverty.'
States argue that they do not have sufficient resources to provide
even the basic necessities to their entire populations. Under the
Court's current case law, it is unclear whether all destitute individuals
could claim that the State has violated their rights to a dignified life.
In light of this possibility, this article proposes an analysis that the
Inter-American Court can apply to distinct classes of applicants who
attempt to establish a prima facie case for the violation of this right.
This article also proposes defenses for the State and the allocation of
kidnapping of a person is an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, an infringement of a
detainee's right to be taken without delay before a judge and to invoke the
appropriate procedures to review the legality of the arrest." Id at 1155. "The
practice of disappearances often involves secret execution without trial, followed by
concealment of the body to eliminate any material evidence of the crime and to
ensure the impunity of those responsible. This is a flagrant violation of the right to
life." Id. at 157.
19. See African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21,
1986, arts. 1-26; FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES' RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND
SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (2003).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 113-116. The President of the Inter-
American Commission, in his Presentation of the 2005 Annual Report of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, stated "currently in Latin American and
the Caribbean, there are more than 20 million unemployed persons; seven out of
every ten new jobs are informal; ... and many workers do not earn enough to keep
their families above the poverty line." Evelio Fernandez Arevalos, Presentation of
the 2005 Annual Report of the IACHR by President (Apr. 27, 2006),
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2006eng/ANNEXES/Annex%203eng.htm>. He
continued, stating, "[i]n its recently released report, 'Poverty Reduction and Growth:
Virtuous Cycles and Vicious Cycles,' the World Bank has pointed out once again that
Latin America continues to be one of the most unequal regions." Id.
2008]
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the burden of proof between the applicant and the State.
Part II of this article gives a brief description of the Inter-
American human rights system. Part III delineates the
interrelationship between civil and political rights and economic,
social, and cultural rights in international law. Part IV argues that the
lack of basic economic and social rights constitutes discrimination
under international law. Part V analyzes the justiciability of
economic, social, and cultural rights. Part VI sets forth the merger of
civil and political rights with social and economic rights within the
context of the right to life in the American Convention. In doing so,
it analyzes the Inter-American Court's jurisprudence on the right to a
dignified life and evaluates State limitations on this right. In Part VII
the author formulates the elements that applicants must set forth to
establish a prima facie case of State liability for a violation of the right
to a dignified life and outlines defenses which could be argued by the
State.
II. The Inter-American Human Rights System
A basic understanding of the structure and functioning of the
Inter-American human rights system is necessary to understand the
potential impact of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights on the right to life. The Organization of American
States ("OAS"), a regional organization composed of the States in
the Western hemisphere,21 adopted the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man22 and later promulgated a treaty, the
21. Although Cuba is a member State of the OAS, in 1962 its current government
was excluded from participating because it adopted a Marxist-Leninist form of
government. Organization of American States [OAS], Eighth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, at 12, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. CfI.8
(1962), available at <http://www.oas.org/columbus/docs/OEASerCII.8Eng.pdf>.
22. OAS, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 1, OAS
Doc. OAS/Ser.LV/I.4 rev. 9 (1948) [hereinafter American Declaration], available at
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic.TOC.htm>. The American
Declaration, which is a resolution, was the first international statement of human
rights; it was adopted several months prior to the United Nations' adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Inter-American Court holds that the
American Declaration creates international obligations for the Member States of the
OAS. Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights,
Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, July 14, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 10
(1989).
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American Convention on Human Rights.23 The Declaration and the
Convention set forth the minimum rights to be protected in the
Americas. Although the American Declaration specifies a broad
spectrum of rights, including economic and social rights, the
American Convention is generally limited to civil and political rights.
The Convention protects twenty-six substantive rights, including the
right to life, but it has only one general provision requiring States
parties to take measures to allow for the progressive realization of
economic and social rights.24 Consequently, to provide protection for
these rights, the OAS later promulgated the Additional Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, also referred to as the
"Protocol of San Salvador."
25
The American Convention, which entered into force in 1978, is
binding on the twenty-four States that are parties to the treaty (States
parties).2 6 It empowers two bodies, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to
enforce the rights enshrined in the Convention. The Convention also
details specific procedures these two enforcement organs must follow
in dealing with individual complaints of human rights abuse. Under
the American Convention, States parties automatically agree to the
right of an individual to file a petition with the Inter-American
Commission alleging State violations of individual human rights.27
The Inter-American Commission has a dual role in the Inter-
23. American Convention, supra note 2.
24. Id. at art. 26.
25. OAS, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, also referred to as "Protocol of
San Salvador," OAS Treaty Series No. 69 (1988), (entered into force November 16,
1999), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
American System, OAS/Ser.LV/I.4 rev. 12 (Jan. 31, 2007), available at
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic.TOC.htm> [hereinafter Protocol of
San Salvador].
26. As of November 1, 2007, the twenty-four States Parties to the American
Convention are: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Suriname,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. See <http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/
memberstates.asp>. Trinidad & Tobago, which had been a State Party to the
American Convention, denounced it in 1998. The United States, Canada, Belize,
Suriname, and some Caribbean countries have not yet ratified the American
Convention.
27. American Convention, supra note 2, at art. 44.
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American human rights system. The Commission has the
competence to examine individual petitions denouncing human rights
violations in any OAS member State, by virtue of State ratification of
the OAS Charter. If the State has not also ratified the American
Convention on Human Rights, as is the case with both the United
States and Canada, the Commission will determine whether the State
violated the protections set forth in the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man. For the American States that are also
States parties to the American Convention on Human Rights, the
Commission determines whether the States have violated the
American Convention. Those OAS member States that have not
ratified the American Convention are still subject to the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which also protects the
right to life.'
The Inter-American Court, the sole judicial organ of the
Organization of American States, is based in San Jose, Costa Rica.29
The American Convention authorizes the Court to adjudicate
contentious cases alleging State violations of human rights, to issue
advisory opinions, and to order States to take provisional measures to
protect persons who are in grave and urgent danger." The Court's
contentious jurisdiction empowers it to adjudicate cases arising from
alleged governmental violations of individual human rights protected
28. See Jo M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2-7 (Cambridge, 2003) [hereinafter
PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS]. All American States ratified the OAS Charter, a treaty which, as
amended, established the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, to promote
the "observance and protection of human rights" and to serve as a consultative organ
of the OAS in human rights matters. Charter of the Organization of American States
art. 106, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951); amended by Protocol of
Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 721 U.N.T.S. 324; amended by Protocol of Cartagena,
approved Dec. 5, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 527; amended by Protocol of Washington, approved
Dec. 14, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 1005; amended by Protocol of Managua, adopted June 10,
1993, 33 I.L.M. 1009.
29. States Parties to the American Convention that also have accepted the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court are Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Trinidad and Tobago denounced the Court's jurisdiction
when it denounced the American Convention. Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, Information History, <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/historia.cfm?&CFID=
355170&CFFOKEN=70670025> (visited Nov. 1, 2007).
30. American Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 62-64.
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by the American Convention." It. is within the Court's role as
adjudicator of individual allegations of human rights abuse that the
Court rendered its judgments on the right to live a dignified life.
III. The Interrelationship Between Civil and Political
Rights and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
All persons should have the means to acquire the basic
necessities of life so as to allow them to live a dignified existence and
enjoy the rights and freedoms essential to life. Nonetheless,
historically human rights have been conceptually divided into two
categories: civil and political rights; and economic, social, and cultural
rights.32 Civil and political rights include inter alia the rights to life,
humane treatment, a fair trial, assembly, equal protection, property,
and judicial protection, as well as the freedoms of expression,
religion, and association. These rights and freedoms are sometimes
referred to as "first generation" rights in that they were the first
human rights formally recognized by States and international law.
Generally, civil and political rights have been considered immediately
enforceable by a State because they purportedly require very little or
no positive action on the part of the government.33 In other words,
theoretically, the government's obligation to protect and insure civil
and political rights has been primarily negative. According to this
common conceptualization, the State must merely refrain from
interfering with the right or freedom protected. For example, the
State may not restrict most forms of speech through acts such as
censorship, nor may it inhibit individuals from practicing the religion
they choose. Despite this characterization, however, scholars and
international bodies emphasize that most civil and political rights do,
in fact, require some positive action on behalf of the State?4  For
instance, the right to a fair trial requires, at a minimum, that the State
31. Id at art. 62.
32. See Asbjorn Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 9, 10 (Asbjorn Eide, Catarina Krause,
and Allan Rosas, eds., Nijhoff Publ. 2nd ed. 2001) [hereinafter Eide, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights] (citing G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986)). A third category of rights, sometimes referred to as
"third generation rights" is emerging. These rights may include the rights to
development, self-determination, natural resources, a healthy environment, and
group and collective rights.
33. Seeid. (citing G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. AIRES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986)).
34. Id
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provide court houses, judges, and support staff, all of which require
positive action and resources on the part of the State.
Economic, social, and cultural rights include inter alia the rights
to adequate nutrition, clothing, housing, essential health care, work,
social security, and free, compulsory, and accessible primary
education." These "second generation" rights have been referred to
as "aspirational goals" because they call for significant positive action
on the part of the State, which likely requires time and resources.'
As such, treaties specify that States may achieve the full realization of
these rights progressively over a period of time.37 Practical difficulties
often inhibit State implementation of generalized norms of economic,
social, and cultural rights because they may require substantial State
expenditures. The right to a certain level of schooling, for instance,
dictates that States provide schools and teachers. The right to
adequate mental and physical health may require that States staff
health care services.
During the Cold War, Western nations denied that economic,
social, and cultural issues could be legitimately classified as rights.3'
35. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]; Protocol of San Salvador, supra note
25 at arts. 6-18.
36. See Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, supra note
32 (citing G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986); see Ellen Wiles,
Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio-Economic
Rights in National Law, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 35, 45-48 (2006) for an analysis of
positive v. negative rights. The author states that, "[t]o label socio-economic rights as
positive rights detracts from the fundamental nature of their context; in essence, they
consist of rights to a provision of resources necessary in order to live a minimally
decent life within society." Id at 48.
37. The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that, "[e]ach
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical,
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures." ICESCR, supra
note 35 at, art. 2(1); The Maastricht Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights point out that the full realization of many civil and political rights can also
only be achieved progressively. Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3, 5' Sess., 8,U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/13 (2000)[hereinafter Maastricht Guidelines]; see also American
Convention, supra note 2, at art. 26.
38. See Irish Human Rights Commission, ESCR Discussion Document (May
2006), <http://www.ihrc.ie/_fileupload/banners/ESCRDiscussionDocument.pdf>;
Philip Alston, Economic and Social Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTs: AN AGENDA FOR THE
NEXT CENTURY 137, 152 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994).
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In the view of the West, civil and political rights were the only valid
enforceable rights. Conversely, the Soviet bloc stressed economic,
social, and cultural rights to the exclusion of others, arguing, for
example, that the right to vote was irrelevant if an individual did not
have food. As a result of these differences, the United Nations could
not draft one comprehensive human rights treaty including all the
rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Instead, it promulgated two separate human rights treaties: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)39 and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR). '° Today, almost all the world's States have ratified or
acceded to both treaties. One hundred and sixty States are parties to
the ICCPR and 155 States are parties to the ICESCR.41
As expressed by the Vienna Declaration adopted at the 1993
World Conference on Human Rights, most international law scholars
and activists now consider human rights to be "universal, indivisible,
interdependent and interrelated., 42 Other international instruments
have also adopted the position that all human rights, which include
economic and social rights as well as civil and political rights, are
essential to the actualization of individuals in society.43 The preamble
to the Protocol of San Salvador, for example, recognizes that "the
ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may
enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights as well as his civil and
political rights."'
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), available at
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf>.
40. ICESCR, supra note 35.
41. ICCPR, supra note 2; ICESCR, supra note 35.
42. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23, 32 ILM 1661 (12 July 1993) (adopted at the 1993 World Conference
on Human Rights) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
43. ICESCR, supra note 35; Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 25; see
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), arts. 1, 2(3), 5(e), 660 U.N.T.S. 195
(Dec. 21, 1965); see also Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, pmbl.; arts. 1, 3, 34 U.N. GAOR,
34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979); Convention on the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 4, U.N. GOAR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1999).
44. Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 25, at preamble.
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IV. The Lack of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as
Discriminatory
When the right to life is jeopardized because individuals do not
have the resources to secure adequate food, potable water, or basic
necessary medical care, the State may be deemed to be discriminating
against those whose rights it has pledged to protect. Human rights
treaties require that the signatory states ensure the rights protected to
all persons without discrimination.45  Within this context, the
American Convention and other human rights instruments
specifically prohibit States from discriminating against persons on the
basis of their "economic status." 6 States must protect and ensure the
human rights of those subject to their jurisdiction whether they are
poor or rich. The United Nations Human Rights Committee
considers that the right to life, in conjunction with the prohibition on
discrimination, gives the right a social and economic content.
When individuals cannot acquire the basic necessities of life, they
may despair and become angered by the perceived injustice of their
life situations. That desperation could lead to violence and a
breakdown of society, inducing further violations of human rights.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt stated that "essential to peace is a decent
standard of living for all individual men and women and children in
all nations. Freedom from fear is eternally linked with freedom from
want." Mary Robinson, former U.N. High Commissioner of Human
Rights, terms poverty and related social ills as "problems of injustice"
rather than simply "problems of inadequate resources, or lack of
45. American Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(1).
46. Id. The Convention also prohibits discrimination for "any other social
condition." Id. See CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGA, THE AMERICAN CONVENC16N
AMERICANA: TEORfA Y JURISPRUDENCIA, VIDA, INTEGRIDAD PERSONAL, LIBERTAD
PERSONAL, DEBIDO PROCESO Y RECURSO JUDICIAL 118-23 (Universidad e Chile,
2005). See The Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 37, at 1 11; See ICESCR, supra
note 35, at art. 2(2).
47. CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGA, "LA CONVENCION AMERICANA: TEORfA Y
JURISPRUDENCIA": VIDA, INTEGREDAD PERSONAL, LIBERTAD PERSONAL, DEBIDO
PROCESO Y RECURSO JUDICIAL 119 (2005) (citing U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No.
40, 291, 302, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995); U.N. GAOR 51st Sess., Supp. No.
40, 221, U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (Apr. 13, 1997); U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 40,
308, 310, U.N. Doc. A/53/40 (Sept. 15, 1998); U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No.
40, 242, U.N. Doc. A/54/40 (Oct. 21, 1999)).
48. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union Address in 90
CONG. REc. 55, 57 (Jan. 14, 1944).
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political will. '49 The Inter-American Court holds that States are
obligated "to guarantee the creation of the conditions required" so
that people can live dignified lives.0
V. Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
A long-held argument against the view that economic, social, and
cultural goals are "rights" is that they cannot be enforced in a court of
law, i.e., that they are not justiciable." Conversely, other experts
posit that some economic, social, and cultural rights are self-
executing, and as such, may be enforced directly by State judicial
authorities. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, which holds many of these rights to be
justiciable, has mandated that, "appropriate means of redress, or
remedies, must be available to any aggrieved individual or group, and
appropriate means of ensuring governmental accountability must be
put in place."53 The Maastricht Guidelines on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights specify that "victims of violations of economic, social,
and cultural rights should have access to effective judicial or other
appropriate remedies at both national and international levels."-
' 4
49. Mary Robinson, Human Rights Challenge: Advancing Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 56 HSTLJ 1059, 1059 (2005). It has "become apparent that
questions of inequality underlie many of the broader problems of political violence..
." Matthew Craven, The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under
the inter-American System of Human Rights,289, 289 in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS (Asbjcrn Eide, Catarina Krause, and Allan Rosas, eds., Nijhoff
Publ. 2nd ed. 2001).
50. Street Children, supra note 1, at T 144.
51. See Martin Scheinin, Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights 29, 29-54 in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Asbjcrn Eide, Catarina Krause, and
Allan Rosas, eds., Nijhoff Publ. 2nd ed. 2001). Compare Ellen Wiles, Aspirational
Principles or Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio-Economic Rights in National
Law, 22 AM. U. INT'L REV, 35 (2006) (presentation of conflicting arguments).
52. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3,
The Nature of States Parties Obligations, 5th Sess., annex III at 86, 5, U.N. Doc.
E/1991/23 (1991), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N.
Doc./HRI/Gen/1/Rev.6 at 14 (2003).
53. Id. at General Comment No. 9. The Domestic Application of the Covenant,
19th Sess., 2, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1998/24 (Dec. 12, 1998). The Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights defines justiciability in this context to mean the
authority of domestic courts to "take account of Covenant rights where this is
necessary to ensure that the State's conduct is consistent with its obligations under
the Covenant." Id. at 14.
54. Maastricht Guidelines, in Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
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Although international bodies, such as the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights have argued that all persons have the right
to a dignified life,55 the Inter-American Court is the first international
court to hold that economic and social rights are justiciable within the
context of the right to life, which has heretofore been the
quintessential civil and political right. The European Court of
Human Rights has also merged civil and political rights with
economic, social, and cultural rights, but in the context of the right to
be free of inhumane or degrading treatment.-6
Judgments of the Inter-American Court automatically become
part of the national law in some States. When economic, social, and
cultural rights are codified in national legislation, plaintiffs can rely
on these statutory rights in domestic courts and they are more likely
to be enforced.57 Thus, the Inter-American Court's holding that the
right to life includes the right to a dignified life can have a direct
effect on the people in the Americas.
VI. Merger of Civil and Political Rights with Social and
Economic Rights Within the Context of the Right to Life
of the American Convention
Article 4(1) of the American Convention provides that "[e]very
person has the right to have his life respected. 5 8 The Inter-American
Court holds that protection of the right to life is "essential for the
exercise of all other human rights" protected by the American
Convention. 9 Consequently, the Court does not view the right to life
Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/13, p. 20 (Oct. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Maastricht Guidelines].
55. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), FACT SHEET
No. 16 (REV. 1), The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1991)
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs16.htm.
56. Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, 39 Eur. Ct. H. R. 43, 148 (2004).
57. See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM.
RTS. Q. 63, 66 (2004). At a minimum, rights must be sufficiently defined to allow
courts to adjudicate complaints that the State has violated these rights and then for
the court decisions to be feasibly implemented.
58. American Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4(1). Article 4(1) continues
"[this right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of
conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." Id.
59. Street Children, supra note 1, at 144; see also Juvenile Reeducation
Institute Case (Paraguay), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, at 1 156 (Sept. 2,
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restrictively.6° In fact, the Court interprets the State's duty to respect
the right to life to include both the negative obligation to refrain from
jeopardizing life and the positive obligation to adopt appropriate
measures to guarantee life.61 Under the State's negative obligation, it
must not arbitrarily deprive individuals of their right to life. Thus,
extrajudicial executions,62 disappearances, and the extension of the
death penalty to include punishment for political offenses or related
common crimes' violate the right to life. Under the State's positive
obligation, the State must not only protect people from the criminal
acts of others, but in addition, according to the Court's recent
jurisprudence, States must guarantee the creation of conditions to
ensure that the right to life is not violated.64 Describing this expansive
2004) [hereinafter Juvenile Reeducation Institute]; G6mez-Paquiyauri Brothers Case
(Perfl), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 110, at T 128 (July 8, 2004); Myrna Mack-
Chang Case (Guatemala), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, at 152 (Nov. 25,
2003) [hereinafter Myrna Mack-Chang]; Juan Humberto Sdnchez Case, (Honduras),
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 99, at 110 (June 7, 2003); Sawhoyamaxa, supra note
9 at 150.
60. Street Children, supra note 1, at 144. The United Nations Human Rights
Committee has also stated that the right to life "is a right which should not be
interpreted narrowly." U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 6: The Right
to Life (art. 6), at T 1, (Apr. 30, 1982). The Committee noted in its General Comment
6 that "the expression 'inherent right to life' cannot properly be understood in a
restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive
measures." Id. at 5.
61. Juvenile Reeducation Institute, supra note 59, at 158 (Sept. 2, 2004) (citing
G6mez-Paquiyauri Brothers Case, supra note 59, at 129; 19 Merchants v. Colombia
(Colombia), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.109, at T 153 (July 5, 2004); Myrna
Mack-Chang Case, supra note 59, at 153 (Nov. 25, 2003).
62. States have a duty to prevent State agents from violating any person's right to
life. Street Children, supra note 1, at T 144. The right to life is violated when
someone is summarily executed by agents of the State without a trial. Many of the
victims of extrajudicial executions are persons who have been targeted as "internal
enemies." See Myrna Mack-Chang, supra note 59, at 139. For example,
Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack, was killed for conducting research and
publishing a book about the internally displaced indigenous people in Guatemala and
the military's role in massacres and human rights violations. Id at 143. The Inter-
American Court held that the death of Myrna Mack was "the result of a covert
military intelligence operation carried out by the Presidential General Staff and
tolerated by various authorities and institutions." Id. at 140. Other victims of
extrajudicial executions are often those who are considered vulnerable and friendless.
In the Street Children case, five Guatemalan youths who lived on the streets of
Guatemala City were summarily killed by members of the National Police Force, and
their bodies were dumped in a public place. Street Children, supra note 1, at 76-83,
142, 147.
63. American Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4(4).
64. Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9, at T 151 (citing Pueblo Bello Massacre Case
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perception, the Inter-American Court stated that,
States must adopt any measures that may be necessary to create
an adequate statutory framework to discourage any threat to the right
to life; to establish an effective system of administration of justice
able to investigate, punish and repair any deprivation of lives by state
agents, or by individuals; and to protect the right of not being
prevented from access to conditions that may guarantee a decent life,
which entails the adoption of positive measures to prevent the breach
of such right.65
Thus, pursuant to the State's positive obligation, the Inter-
American Court holds that the right to life includes the right of
individuals to develop their lives in a dignified manner. Persons
cannot be made or allowed to live permanently in inhumane and
degrading conditions. 6 According to the United Nations Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the human rights necessary
for people to have a dignified life, or a "full, free, safe, secure and
healthy life," include the "basic necessities of work, food, housing,
health care, education and culture.,
67
The Inter-American Court more generally specifies that the
State, pursuant to its duty to guarantee life, has the obligation to
generate living conditions that are at least minimally "compatible
with the dignity of the human person. ' 6" The State also has the duty
not to create conditions that result in impediments that make life
more difficult for people.69 In this regard, the Court clarified that the
State "has the duty to take positive, concrete measures geared toward
fulfillment of the right to a decent life, especially in the case of
persons who are vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes a high
priority., 70 As explained by Judge Cancado Trindade's concurrence
(Colombia), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No.140, at [ 120 (January 31, 2006)). A
limited positive obligation can also be attributed to the State in this context to take
the necessary measures to protect an individual from the criminal acts of other
individuals.
65. Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9 at 153 (citing Juvenile Reeducation Institute
Case, supra note 59, at 156; Street Children, supra note 1 at 144.
66. Juvenile Reeducation Institute, supra note 59, at $1 170-171.
67. Fact Sheet No.16 (Rev.1), The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, July 1991, available at
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs16.htm> (visited Sept. 16, 2007).
68. Indigenous Community Yakye Axa Case (Paraguay), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
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in the Villagrdn Morales case,
The arbitrary deprivation of life is not limited, thus, to the illicit
act of homicide; it extends itself likewise to the deprivation of the
right to live with dignity. This outlook conceptualizes the right to life
as belonging, at the same time, to the domain of civil and political
rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights, thus illustrating
the interrelation and indivisibility of all human rights."
The individual has the primary obligation to fulfill his or her own
basic needs through individual efforts and the use of private
resources." It may not be possible, however, for every person to
satisfy elementary needs when that person has no access to resources
or cannot exert efforts due to a handicap or to detainment. The
disenfranchised poor, the disabled, children, or persons who are
imprisoned or institutionalized may not have access to the necessities
that will fulfill even their most basic human needs.
A. Extra Protection for Vulnerable Groups
Although the State must respect and ensure the right to life of all
people under its jurisdiction,73 the State's obligation to take positive
action is even more pronounced for those who are vulnerable and
powerless in society. The Inter-American Court holds that "any
person who is in a vulnerable condition is entitled to special
protection, which must be provided by the States if they are to
comply with their general duties to respect and guarantee human
rights." 74  The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights specify that the groups who suffer
disproportionate harm include "lower-income groups, women,
indigenous and tribal peoples, occupied populations, asylum seekers,
refugees and internally displaced persons, minorities, the elderly,
children, landless peasants, persons with disabilities and the
71. Street Children, supra note 1, (Cancado Trindade and Abreu Burelli,
concurring at 4).
72. See Asbjcrn Eide et. al., The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living
Including the Right to Food, 133, 139 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2d ed.) (2001),
(citing Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4,1986)).
73. American Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(1).
74. Ximenes-Lopes Case (Brazil), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 149, at J 103
(July 4, 2006) (citing Balde6n-Garcia Case (Peru), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No.
147, at 81 (April 06, 2006)); Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9, at 154; Pueblo Bello
Massacre Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 140, at 111 (January 31, 2006).
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homeless., 75 This list is broader than the list of vulnerable groups
identified to date in the case law of the Inter-American Court.
Specifically, the Inter-American Court has adjudicated cases
involving the right to a dignified life for children, the aged, prisoners,
mentally handicapped persons who are confined to State-run
facilities, and indigenous populations that have lost their ancestral
lands.76 Where the right to life of persons in these groups is at risk,
the Court has mandated that the State take special actions to prevent
or remedy the violation of the right to live a dignified life.7
i Children and Pregnant Women
The Inter-American Court has held that the State's obligation to
protect the right to life "has special modes regarding to minors."78
With respect to children, the Court holds that "[tihe measures that
the State must undertake, particularly given the provisions of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, encompass economic, social
and cultural aspects that pertain, first and foremost, to the children's
right to life and right to humane treatment.",79 In other words, the
State's role as guarantor obligates the State to prevent situations that
might lead, by action or omission, to adverse effects on the right to a
dignified life of children8
Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, "parents have
the primary responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial
capabilities, the conditions of living necessary for their children's
development.",8 ' This widely-ratified treaty also specifies that when
necessary and within the State's means, the State must take measures
to assist parents with nutrition, clothing and housing needs.' The
75. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOCI, Committee on Economic, Cultural
and Social Rights, Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, J 20, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/13 (Nov. 27, 2000).
76. Ximenes-Lopes Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 149, at 104 (July 4,
2006).
77. G6mez-Paquiyauri Brothers Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 110, at 'l
124 (July 8,2004).
78. Id. (citing Bulacio Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 100, at 91138 (Sept.
18, 2003)).
79. Juvenile Reeducation Institute, supra note 59, at 149.
80. Bulacio Case (Argentina), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 100, at 138 (Sept.
18, 2003).
81. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A Res. 45/25, Art. 27(2), U.N. Doc.
AIRES/45/25 (Nov. 20, 1989).
82. Id. at art. 27(3).
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supplemental responsibility of States set forth in the treaty is in line
with the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court.
The Inter-American Court has also stated that the State must
provide special attention and care to pregnant women.83 Especially
during the period of the pregnancy, birth and breast-feeding, the
State should guarantee access to adequate medical attention and
services. This accords with its responsibility to children."'
ii. The Aged
Persons of advanced age merit special consideration by the
State. 5 In the Yakye Axa case, which primarily addressed the right to
the ancestral lands of an indigenous people, the Court stated that in
respect to the elderly the State must "take measures to ensure their
continuing functionality and autonomy, guaranteeing their right to
adequate food, access to clean water and health care. Specifically, the
State must provide care for the elderly with chronic diseases and in
terminal stages, to help them avoid unnecessary suffering. '
iii. Indigenous Peoples Who Have Lost Their Ancestral Lands
Other vulnerable groups, such as indigenous peoples who have
been excluded from their ancestral lands and cannot, thus, provide for
themselves, may require special State protection to fulfill their right
to live dignified lives. In the Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa cases
against Paraguay, the Inter-American Court held that the State, by
delaying the processing of their applications for the restitution of the
communities' ancestral lands, exacerbated their living conditions and
thereby violated their rights to live dignified lives." The community
members lived for several years along side the roads leading to the
entrances to their ancestral lands, awaiting the domestic resolution of
their petitions for land restitution.' The Court found that the people
had lived in "extremely destitute conditions" because of the
precariousness of their temporary settlement and the related
difficulties of obtaining food, clean water, adequate housing, and
83. Sawhoyamaxa, surpa note 9, at 177.
84. Id.
85. Yakye Axa, supra note 5, at 175.
86. Id
87. Id at 168, 176.
88. Id at IT 50.8, 164.
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health care.89 In the Yakye Axa case, the Court required that while
the Community was in a state of vulnerability without its ancestral
lands and without the ability to resort to its traditional means of
subsistence, the State was obligated to periodically provide food,
latrines, potable water, and medical attention and medications
especially for the children, elderly and pregnant women.90 Thus, the
Court held, the State was liable for the violation of the right to life of
the Yakye Axa People for not adopting positive measures in the face
of the conditions that affected their possibility of having dignified
lives.9'
iv. Detainees or Those Interned in State-run Facilities
The Inter-American Court holds that the State has a special
obligation to provide persons who are subjugated by the State with
the conditions for a dignified life.' The Court stated that "all persons
detained have the right to live in prison conditions that are in keeping
with their dignity as human beings and that the State must guarantee
their right to life and their right to humane treatment."9'' In this
regard, the Inter-American Court established that,
The State has a special role to play as guarantor of the rights of
those deprived of their freedom, as the prison authorities exercise
heavy control or command over the persons in their custody.94 So
there is a special relationship and interaction of subordination
between the person deprived of his liberty and the State; typically the
State can be rigorous in regulating what the prisoner's rights and
obligations are, and determines what the circumstances of the
internment will be; the inmate is prevented from satisfying, on his
89. Id at TT 164-68.
90. Id at T 221.
91. Id at T 161. These decisions have arguably been the most controversial of
the Court's jurisprudence on the right to a dignified life. They open the' possibility
that wide-ranging groups or classes of individuals could bring cases before the Court.
92. Juvenile Reeducation Institute, supra note 59 at 176.
93. Id. at T 151; See also Bulacio Case (Argentina), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No.100, at J 126, 138 (Sept. 18, 2003); Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. Case
(Trinidad and Tobago), (ser. C) No.94, at 165 (June 21, 2002).
94. "Juvenile Reeducation Institute" Case (Paraguay), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser.C) No. 112, at 152 (September 2, 2004) (citing G6mez-Paquiyauri Brothers
Case (Pert), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 110, at T 98 (July 8, 2004)); Juan
Humberto SAnchez Case (Honduras), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 99, at 111
(June 7, 2003); Bulacio Case (Argentina), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 100, at
138 (Sept. 18, 2003).
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own, certain basic needs that are essential if one is to live with dignity
(vida digna).95
The State must assume special responsibilities to guarantee to
prisoners and others interned in state-run facilities the conditions
necessary to live dignified lives. A person who is deprived of liberty
must still be permitted to enjoy those rights that cannot be restricted
under any circumstances as well as those rights that need not be
restricted because of the internment.96 The privation of liberty does
not deprive a person of all human rights.97
In the Juvenile Reeducation Institute case, incarcerated minors
were exposed to violence, insecurity, abuses, corruption, and
promiscuity." Quite literally, a policy of the survival of the fittest,
with all its deplorable consequences, was imposed on all the inmates.'
The Court found that the conditions at the Institute never permitted
those interned there "deprived of their liberty to live with dignity. ' 00
According to the findings of the Court, the State permitted its agents
to threaten the inmates and to subject them constantly to cruel,
inhumane, and degrading treatment resulting in a "vida indigna"
[undignified life] that affected the prisoners' development, their right
to life, and their life projects. 1 Consequently, the State had not
complied with its obligation to "necessary positive measures to
ensure" conditions for a dignified life to those deprived of their
95. Juvenile Reeducation Institute, supra note 59, at 152.
96. Id. at 153.
97. Id
98. Id at 170.
99. Juvenile Reeducation Institute, supra 59, at 170.
100. Id
101. Id In earlier cases, the Inter-American Court has discussed damages to the
victim's "proyecto de vida," which may be translated as "life plan" or "life project."
The Court stated that:
[t]he concept of a "life plan" is akin to the concept of personal fulfillment,
which in turn is based on the options that an individual may have for leading
his life and achieving the goal that he sets for himself. Strictly speaking,
those options are the manifestation and guarantee of freedom. An
individual can hardly be described as truly free if he does not have options to
pursue in life and to carry that life to its natural conclusion. Those options,
in themselves, have an important existential value. Hence, their elimination
or curtailment objectively abridges freedom and constitutes the loss of a
valuable asset, a loss that this Court cannot disregard.
Loayza-Tamayo Case (Peru) (Reparations), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 42 at
148; see PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 270-72.
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liberty.'" The Court mandated that the State, in its role as guarantor,
"has an obligation to design and apply a crisis-prevention prison
policy."1 3
Alternatively, the Inter-American Court could have held solely
that abysmally poor prison conditions are a violation of a detainee's
right to humane treatment rather than a violation of the right to life.
The Court has held that unlivable prison conditions are both a
violation of the right to life and the right to humane treatment.' The
American Convention provides that "[a]ll persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person.'1 °5 If they are not, it is a violation of the traditional
civil and political right to humane treatment, i.e., to have their
"physical, mental, and moral integrity respected."'" In similar
circumstances to those considered by the Inter-American Court, the
European Court of Human Rights has focused on the violation of the
right to humane treatment rather than a violation of the right to life.1"
A violation of the right to humane treatment may be found by the
European Court based on such factors as cell size, sanitary conditions,
the degree of overcrowding, opportunities for exercise and recreation,
and medical treatment. " The ill-treatment of the detainee must
reach a minimum level of severity to constitute a violation of the right
to be free of inhumane treatment9
B. Limitations on the State's Liability for Violation of the Right
to a Vida Digna
Many States argue that they do not have financial resources
available to provide for the alimentary, sanitary, and educational
necessities of all of their citizens. In the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
102. Juvenile Reeducation Institute, supra note 59, at $ 176.
103. Id. at $ 178 (quoting Urso Branco Prison Case (Brazil) Provisional Measures,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. E) 13 (July 7, 2004)).
104. Montero Aranguren et al. (Bolivia) (the Catia Detention Center Case), Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, at 104 (July 5, 2006) [hereinafter the Catia
Detention Center].
105. American Convention, supra note 2, at art. 5(2).
106. Id. at art. 5(1).
107. Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 652, 135 (1998).
108. Id.
109. Id at 94. The European Court stated in this regard that
"[t]he assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of
the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and/or mental effects and,
in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim." Id.
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Community case, Paraguay argued that its ability to provide essential
services was limited by its relatively undeveloped economic state, the
inequality of international commerce, and its own financial
limitations. " In the "Juvenile Reeducation Institute" case, the
Paraguayan government asked the Inter-American Court to consider
the government's limitations and lack of resources which kept the
State from responding in an optimal manner to the plight of the
children detained in the Institute."' Paraguay reminded the Court
that even the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of their Liberty provide that "[t]he Rules shall be
implemented in the context of the economic, social, and cultural
conditions prevailing in each Member State....
The unequal division of wealth in Latin America results in large
populations of vulnerable persons in some States. For example,
according to the Inter-American Development Bank, only 23% of
Nicaraguan and 40% of Honduran residents have access to adequate
sanitary facilities."3  The United Nations Development Project
reports that in El Salvador 18% of the population does not have
sustainable access to an improved water source." 4 In Bolivia, 62.7 %
of the population lives below the national poverty line."5  In
Guatemala, 56.2 % and in El Salvador, 48.3 % live below the national
poverty lines."
6
Considering such practical impediments, the Inter-American
Court has recognized limitations on the State's obligation to protect
and insure the right to a dignified life.17 The Court states that "[t]he
110. Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9, at 147. Paraguay also argued that it has
attempted to create the necessary conditions to guarantee a dignified life to displaced
indigenous peoples by periodically giving them food and sanitary assistance. Id.
111. Juvenile Reeducation Institute, supra note 59, at 141(g). The Government
also argued that it lacked the means to separate those who were charged and those
who were convicted. Id. at I 143(d).
112. Id. at 91 143(i) (Sept. 2, 2004) (quoting U.N. Rules for the Protection of
Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, fundamental perspective 16, G.A. Res. 45/113,
annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A), at 205, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990)).
113. Inter-American Development Bank, SocioMetro Studies, available at
<http://www.iadb.org/sociometro/>.




117. Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9, at 1 155 (citing the Pueblo Bello Massacre Case
(Colombia), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, 91 124 (Jan. 31, 2006)); Kilic v.
Turkey, App. No. 22492/93, 1 63, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
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object and purpose of the [American] Convention, as an instrument
for the protection of the human being, requires that the right to life
be interpreted and enforced so that its guarantees are truly practical
and effective."'' 8 Accordingly, the Court recognized that:
[A] State cannot be responsible for all situations in which the right
to life is at risk. Taking into account the difficulties involved in the
planning and adoption of public policies and the operative choices
that have to be made in view of the priorities and the resources
available, the positive obligations of the State must be interpreted
so that an impossible or disproportionate burden is not imposed
upon the authorities."'
Thus, the Inter-American Court holds that a State must adopt
the necessary measures within the scope of its attributions that,
judged reasonably, could be expected to prevent or avoid the risk to
the life of those subject to the State's jurisdiction. °
Not all international bodies take such a restrictive view of States'
obligations. The Maastricht Guidelines, citing to the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, go beyond the jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Court in specifying that the State has a duty to
satisfy the minimum core obligations of essential food, primary health
case, and basic shelter and education "irrespective of the availability
of resources" or of other difficulties. 2 ' The Guidelines provide that
"[r]esource scarcity does not relieve States of certain minimum
obligations in respect of the implementation of economic, social, and
cultural rights., 122  Moreover, international development
organizations often find that "poverty and severe deprivation [are] a
product less of a lack of public goods than of officially promoted or
tolerated policies of social exclusion."'" Thus, according to this
118. Catia Detention Center, supra note 104, at 64; Balde6n-Garcia Case (Pert),
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 147, at 83 (April 06, 2006).
119. Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9, at 155 (citing the Pueblo Bello Massacre Case
(Colombia), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 140, at 124 (January 31, 2006); Kilic v.
Turkey, App. No. 22492/93, 1 63, Eur. Ct. H.R. (28 March 2000).
120. Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9, at 160.
121. Maastricht Guidelines, at 18 U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/13 (2000).
122. Id.
123. See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization 26 HuM. RRS.
Q. 63, 72-73 (2004). The right to a dignified life, and therefore the right to life, is
violated when the State government is corrupt and that corruption diminishes or
drains the public coffers. Should the State also be responsible for inept management
or for favoring one sector of society over another? For instance, if the government
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viewpoint, State policies should be questioned to determine whether
the lack of economic resources is due to an intentional governmental
course of action or intentional exclusion.
VII. Proposed Analysis for the Violation of the Right to
Live a Dignified Life
Although the Inter-American Court has determined that there is
a right to a dignified life, the question arises as to whether the Court
will limit this right only to those vulnerable groups that it has
recognized, extend it to all traditionally vulnerable groups, or further
extend the right to any person or group that is known by the
government to be in dire circumstances through some action,
negligence or inaction of the government. The most expansive
protection of the right to a dignified life would recognize the right as
available to anyone. Extending the right to all people would
acknowledge that every person has the inalienable right to a life with
basic necessities such as food, water, and sanitation. It would be the
State's responsibility to provide the means for people to fulfill their
own needs, not obstruct peoples' ability to satisfy their basic needs,
and, when necessary, to assist them in meeting those needs.
International court judgments holding States liable for a violation of
the right to a dignified life then would support civil society in its
efforts to hold governments accountable for financial decisions and
compel governments to enter into a dialog about the relative use of
public funds. Importantly, it would apply additional pressure against
governmental corruption and self-aggrandizing projects.
A less expansive view, while still recognizing a right to a dignified
life, would make the right justiciable only for vulnerable groups. The
Court could limit the right to those groups it has recognized, such as
those incarcerated by the State, children, the aged, and landless
indigenous peoples or it could extend the right to other vulnerable
groups who have traditionally suffered social exclusion and
discrimination. These groups and individuals often encounter innate
impediments in satisfying their basic necessities, and thus, it could be
argued that they merit additional assistance from the State.
Furthermore, from a practical standpoint, if only certain vulnerable
attempts to further international trade so as to increase its foreign currency reserves
to pay its foreign debt and as a result does not have the resources to provide basic
social services to the poor, should it be liable internationally for failing to provide a
dignified life to part of its population?
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groups could allege a violation of the right to a dignified life, the
burden on international protective organs would be more
manageable.
There is, of course, the perspective that the enforcement of a
right to a dignified life is impractical and should not be judicially
recognized. This position relies on the long-held argument against
the recognition of economic and social rights in general; that the
attempt to enforce them would dilute the protection afforded civil
and political rights. According to this position, the vast numbers of
persons who live in abject poverty would overwhelm human rights
organs and monitoring bodies with claims that States have violated
their right to live a dignified life. As a result, other cases involving
important issues such as extrajudicial executions, freedom of
expression, and rights to a fair trial would languish, due to the
backlog in the system. In the Inter-American system, the
Commission and the Court would arguably be overwhelmed if even a
small proportion of those in the Americas who suffer from aggravated
poverty were to file such complaints. This would also be true for the
African human rights system which already ensures many economic
and social rights.
A. Essential Elements
The Inter-American Court has held that three elements are
essential to any case against a State for violation of the right to a
dignified life. The applicants first must show that they lack the most
basic necessities of life, such as access to potable water, sufficient
food, sanitary facilities, and basic health care. Second, the applicant
must show that the State knew or had reason to know of the
vulnerable situation that was jeopardizing the right to life of groups
or individuals within its jurisdiction.'24 Third, a causal relationship
must exist between the States' action, negligence or omission and the
deplorable living conditions of the alleged victims. The initial burden
to prove these elements must be on the applicants, who allege that
124. Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9, at 1 157. "In order for this positive obligation to
arise, it must be determined that at the moment of the occurrence of the events, the
authorities knew or should have known about the existence of a situation posing an
immediate and certain risk to the life of an individual or of a group of individuals,
and that the necessary measures were not adopted within the scope of their authority
which could be reasonably expected to prevent or avoid such risk." Id. at 1 155
(citing to Pueblo Bello Massacre Case (Colombia), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
140, at 123-24 (Jan. 31, 2006)).
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the State has violated their rights to a dignified life, since the burden
of proof generally lies with the party alleging any human rights
violation.
B. Potential Applicants
Applicants could be divided into three groups for the purpose of
analysis: those living under the exclusive control of the State, alleged
victims who belong to vulnerable groups and, alleged victims who do
not belong to any traditionally recognized vulnerable group.
i. Persons Living Under Exclusive State Control
When the applicants are under the exclusive control of the State,
such as persons in prison, child detention centers, or state mental
health facilities, they generally do not have the opportunity to meet
their own basic needs. Nor should they be dependent on their
families or charity to provide their necessities. The State must be
responsible for providing them with sufficient food, potable water,
basic sanitation, and adequate living space. In addition, the State
must supply them with basic security, like humane treatment by
guards and protection from other inmates. The Inter-American
Court has cited the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners, which could supply the minimum standard of treatment
required in prisons. 5 Another applicable non binding standard
drafted by the UN is the Body of Principles for the Protection of all
Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. 6
The alleged victims may provide evidence in the form of
accounts of witnesses and experts, as well as national or international
records or reports that they are interned by the State and that they
lack the minimum necessities required for a dignified life. When the
applicants carry this burden, it should raise an irrebutable
presumption that first, the State had knowledge or reason to know of
the deficiencies, and second, the lack of basic necessities is caused by
the omission of the State. This presumption should be applied even
when the State has contracted with private companies to provide
facilities normally supplied by the State because these private parties
125. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. Res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at
11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. Res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.
1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977).
126. Adopted by G.A. Res. 43/173 of 9 Dec. 1988.
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serve as agents for the State.
Regardless of other issues, it is the sole responsibility of the State
to provide at least the minimum requirements for a dignified life to
persons who are under its exclusive control. The European Court
holds in this regard that a "lack of resources cannot in principle justify
prison conditions which are so poor as to reach the threshold of
treatment contrary to [freedom from torture and other inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment]."'27 Moreover, it should not be
necessary for the applicants to show that the State had actual
knowledge as State agents are in charge of the facilities.'" Alleged
victims living under the exclusive control of the State should bear a
lesser burden than other groups.
-h Persons in Vulnerable Groups other then those Interned by
the State
A more stringent test could be applied to other alleged victims
who belong to vulnerable groups. Initially, these applicants should
demonstrate that they lack the basic necessities of life and that they
belong to a vulnerable group. According to current Inter-American
case law, in addition to those interned by the State (who would be
subject to the previous analysis), these additional vulnerable groups
have included children, pregnant women, the elderly, and indigenous
and tribal peoples who have lost their land. The Court could extent
the category of vulnerable groups, in accordance with the Maastricht
Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to include
"lower-income groups, women, occupied populations, asylum seekers,
refugees and internally displaced persons, minorities, landless
peasants, persons with disabilities and the homeless." '129
In contrast to applicants who are interned by the State, this
analysis would propose that others in vulnerable groups must
127. Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 38812/97, 148
(2003). "The Court has also borne in mind, when considering the material conditions
in which the applicant was detained and the activities offered to him, that Ukraine
encountered serious socio-economic problems in the course of its systemic transition
and that prior to the summer of 1998 the prison authorities were both struggling
under difficult economic conditions and occupied with the implementation of new
national legislation and related regulations." Id
128. Juvenile Reeducation Institute, supra note 59, at 134(37) (stating that the
Paraguayan government was officially advised of the tension and high level of risk in
the Institute).
129. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 121, at 20.
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demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the State had
actual knowledge or reason to know of the alleged victims' living
situation. State knowledge was shown, for instance, in the case of the
Sawhoyamaxa Community, when government agencies received
requests from the Community detailing its precarious living situation,
lack of medical attention, and the resulting deaths from easily curable
diseases.30 Evidence was submitted to the Court showing that the
Paraguayan executive acknowledged this information by issued an
emergency decree pursuant to which the State provided periodic but
insufficient assistance to the communities.'
Finally, to establish a prima facie case that the right to a dignified
life has been violated the applicants in vulnerable groups must
demonstrate causation. They must show that their situation is the
result of State action, negligence or omission. In the Yakye Axa and
Sawhoyamaxa cases the Court held that the communities' living
conditions were due, in part, to the State's failure to take necessary
actions. Paraguay had failed to opportunely process the communities'
application of the return of their ancestral lands. As a result the
people could not manage their own subsistence by hunting, fishing
and gathering and they did not have access to natural resources such
as clean water or medicinal plants.'32 In proving causation, applicants
may show that the State engaged in arbitrary or discriminatory
policies regarding the distribution of basic necessities, governmental
mismanagement of its resources such as excessive spending on self-
aggrandizing projects, or corruption resulting from the official
appropriation of scarce public resources with impunity. The
applicants' satisfaction of all three elements would raise a rebuttable
presumption that the State is liable for a violation of the right to a
dignified life.
i. Applicants Not Belonging to Traditionally Vulnerable
Groups
Persons lacking the basic necessities in life are not limited to
those in traditionally vulnerable groups. The State may act or omit
acting in such ways that have a detrimental effect on any person or
group. For instance, if the State were to evict or relocate subsistence
130. Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 9, at 158-9. Community leaders also submitted
an anthropological report. Id.
131. Id.
132. Yakye Axa, supra note 5, at 164.
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farmers who lived in an area which was to be flooded by a State dam
project, and as a result of the State's intervention those people lost
their land and subsequently lacked the basic necessities for a dignified
existence, a violation of their right to a vida digna could be
attributable to State action. The State could also fail to act, and due
to that omission or negligence violate the right to a dignified life. In
the Juvenile Reeducation case, in which a fire in a children's
detention center injured and killed inmates,3 3 Paraguay had not taken
sufficient preventative measures to deal with the possibility of a fire
in the Institute.'m Like applicants in traditionally vulnerable groups,
other applicants must show that they lack the most basic necessities of
life. They must also demonstrate state knowledge or reason to know
of their plight, and that the State caused their dire circumstances
through action, negligent or omission. They may demonstrate state
causation by showing a specific action that directly and negatively
affected the applicants lives or more generally that the State engaged
in mismanagement, corruption or the arbitrary and discriminatory
distribution of its resources. These applicants would not have the
benefit of a presumption in their favor.
B. State Defenses
The State can set forth defenses to the applicants' case by
showing any of the following: the applicants are not suffering from a
lack of necessities; the applicants' precarious situation is self-imposed
in that there is paid work available which the applicants arbitrarily
choose not to accept; the applicants are not members of a vulnerable
group (when this element is necessary to the applicant's case); or the
government has not caused the circumstances that resulted in the
applicants living situations. The government also can dispute the
final option by showing that it is making a genuine effort to
progressively comply with its international obligations on economic,
social, and cultural rights by distributing scarce resources equitably
and to the benefit of all groups in society, especially the most
vulnerable. The burden of proof should be on the State when its
defense is that it is unable to fulfill minimum subsistence rights for
133. Juvenile Reeducation Institute, supra note 59, at $$ 178-79.
134. Id. at 178. There were no evacuation plans in case of fire, and there were
no alarms or fire extinguishers. Guards had no training in how to handle emergency
situations. Id.
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reasons beyond its control.13
VIII. Conclusion
States may be in violation of the right to life under the American
Convention even when there is absence of actual death. The Inter-
American Court has expanded the interpretation of the right to life to
include a qualitative aspect to live a dignified life. In doing so, the
Court has made an inroad in merging civil and political rights with
economic, social, and cultural rights and has reinforced the position
that a human being needs a broad spectrum of rights to live a quality
existence. In its jurisprudence, the Inter-American Court has
emphasized that States must adopt positive measures to provide for
this right, particularly in regard to vulnerable and at risk persons.
The Inter-American Court's integration of basic economic and social
rights within the context of right to life, which is arguably the most
basic of the civil and political rights, makes a contribution to the
development of international human rights law. In doing so, it
minimizes the division between the two types of rights, and, thus,
supports the stance that human rights are universal and indivisible.
The difficulty arises in determining the point at which the State is
liable for a violation of the right to a dignified life. Ideally, all
individuals would have the right to the basic necessities required to
live a dignified life. The high level of poverty in many American
States, however, means that the human rights enforcement organs
could be overwhelmed by complaints alleging a violation of the right
to life. The Inter-American Court recognizes that the State's
obligation with respect to a dignified life should not be interpreted so
as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on States,
many of which argue that they lack the necessary economic resources.
This article provides a legal analysis for distinct classes of applicants
who could allege a violation of the right to live a dignified life.
Applicants must first prove that they lack the basic necessities of life
due to State action, negligence or omission. When the applicants are
not under the exclusive control of the State, they must also prove that
the State had actual knowledge or reason to know of the alleged
victims dire circumstances. The burden of proof would fall most
lightly on applicants who are incarcerated or institutionalized in State
facilities, where they have no means of meeting their own basic needs.
135. See Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 121, at 19.
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Other traditionally-recognized vulnerable groups such as children, the
handicapped and those such as indigenous peoples, who have been
systematically discriminated against would bear the additional burden
of demonstrating State knowledge. All other applicants would have a
weightier burden but would still have the possibility of bringing a case
for the violation of a dignified life before the Court. Finally, the State
could raise at least four defenses to dispute its liability or to show that
it is taking adequate measures to assist the applicant in compliance
with its international obligations.
